Introduction
The aftermath of the global financial and European sovereign debt crises has helped highlight a critical strategic challenge for Financial Services: Optimizing Collateral Management.
Looking back, bankruptcy of "too-big-to-fail" banks such as Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers triggered credit confidence to collapse and pushed collateral haircuts upwards by 5 points on average since 2008. Consequently, demand for high-quality collateral -cash and highly liquid securities (mainly G7 bonds) -skyrocketed as it demonstrates the good health of a dealer. However, the supply of quality liquidity plummeted, especially after the sovereign debt crisis. The liquidity crisis that followed during the second phase of the sovereign debt crisis drove banks to adapt their cash and collateral management activities to meet the new market demand.
With the entire financial system under heavy scrutiny, regulatory institutions in Europe and the US (respectively through Basel III, EMIR and Dodd-Frank) launched a new set of requirements to govern Financial Institutions in order to:
• Internally reduce net expositions impacting bank assets through specific mandatory adjustments such as Risk Weight Assets, Counterparty Value Adjustment and CVA VaR; or additional set of liquidity buffers (Basel III European regulations).
-In Europe, an estimated amount of EUR 2,89 Trillion 1 would be necessary to reach the additional liquidity requirements of Basel III.
• Improve transparency and collateralization of sensitive products -such as derivatives and especially swaps ( 3 According to "OTC derivatives reform and collateral demand impact", a study handled by the Bank of England published in October 2012. Hypothesis: estimation evaluated under normal market conditions and holding the current gross notional amount outstanding fixed. "The wide range reflects the sensitivity to assumptions around netting efficiency."
Preamble
The purpose of this paper is to understand how the current financial landscape shaped by the crises and new regulations impacts Investment Banking's business model. We will focus on quantitative implications, i.e. valuation, modeling and pricing issues, as well as qualitative implications, i.e. best practices to manage quantitative aspects and handle these functions to the current Investment Banking organization.
We considered two pillars to shape our vision of collateral optimization: 1. Collateral as a refinancing instrument. Collateral is shifting from a mere hedging instrument for counterparty risk to a strategic refinancing instrument. 2. Improve asymmetric collateral quality and profitability. Recent requirements on collateralization highly impact collateral management through the increase in haircuts and funding of good-quality collateral. As a result, more and more banks are considering their net collateral balance as a KPI, i.e. monitoring their net collateral balance position and identifying the need in cash funding or transforming.
We built our approach on three key standards:
• 
With liquidity scarce, refinancing is on top of financial institution's priorities. Cash collateral is remunerated at a low rate (generally close to the overnight funding rate), and constitutes a great channel of cheap refinancing.
A dealer's objective is to receive more collateral (in cash, if possible) to offset risks on trades than they post on their liabilities. Therefore, those additional assets are used to finance the bank at a low rate.
There are several ways a dealer can use to achieve this:
• For collateral received in cash, the goal is to receive more collateral (in cash by preference) than posted in order to achieve the highest positive net cash collateral balance.
• For collateral received in the form of securities, there are three possibilities: -Transformation into cash: The objective is to convert the securities into cash, by the re-hypothecation (repos, exchanging the collateral at Central banks for cash, posting the securities as collateral for other deals) -Liquidity Coverage Ratio eligibility: Indeed, if the securities are eligible to the LCR, then it permits to replace the retained cash used to be above the ratio. If the securities are not eligible to the LCR, then the dealer has to try to exchange them for eligible securities. -Equity Management: For kept securities (eligible to the LCR or not), the bank may study the accounting options and potential challenges to enhance the value and monitor the variability of its equity.
Cash Collateral

CSA Discounting (OIS Discounting)
Before the financial crisis, the default of a derivatives seller was not considered probable. All pricing models assumed there was no chance of default, and that dealers could borrow or lend at a risk free rate. According to this assumption, LIBOR, the interbank rate of each specified currency zone, was supposed to represent the best estimation of the risk free rate.
After the Lehman Brothers default, the lack of confidence between banks prompted a credit crunch. As a result LIBOR increased sharply. The LIBOR-OIS spread, which is about 10 basis points in normal market conditions rose to a record 364 basis points in October 2008.
This incident led to the following conclusions:
• Zero risk does not exist: The financial community and regulators work on a better measure of counterparty credit risk (CVA, DVA…) • A real risk free position can be set up by a full and perfect cash collateralization • The best estimate for a risk free rate is not LIBOR but OIS -an overnight position is much closer to a riskless position Thus, the collateral rate commonly defined in Collateral Agreements (CSA) is the OIS rate. The CSA (or OIS) discounting consists in using the collateral rate for discounting collateralized transactions.
When a dealer sells a product, he receives an amount in cash equal to the present value. Then he posts this cash as collateral. The buyer pays the collateral rate on the cash collateral. For no arbitrage, the Future Product value has to be equal to the Future Collateral value. Thus, the discounting risk free rate must be the collateral rate.
A pricing framework for collateralized derivatives contracts
CSA Discounting applies when the contract is fully collateralized. It does not take into account partial collateralization, or other impacts linked to partially collateralized deals.
In this section we present a pricing framework for all collateralized derivatives contracts. This framework starts from the value of the derivative contract discounted at risk free rate, and adds successive adjustments to obtain an economic value that comprises residual risks costs (and that matches with their corresponding hedging derivatives).
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that recovery rates are null (CDS Spread coincides with default intensity and Loss Given Default = 1). The results remain valid with recovery rates > 0.
Liquidity Value Adjustment
Definition: The Liquidity Value Adjustment (LVA) is the discounted value of the difference between the collateral rate and the risk free rate on the collateral, and it represents the profit or loss produced by the liquidation of the Net Present Value of the derivative contract due to the collateralization agreement.
We suppose that the collateral rate differs from the risk free rate, so if the contract is (even partially) collateralized, then the value of the operation has to take it into account.
We define γ as the collateralization percentage ( 0 γ = corresponds to a non-collateralized contract while 1 00 % γ = corresponds to a fully collateralized contract).
As described above, if the contract is fully collateralized, then we can apply the collateral rate to discount the expected value of the contract.
Thus, the Liquidity Value Adjustment on a cash collateralized operation is:
Where C r is the collateral rate, and: On a partially collateralized derivative contract, we studied how to evaluate the collateralized part by discounting with the collateral rate. The uncollateralized part is discounted with the risk free rate, but we know that this part is not riskless.
To determine how to price these remaining risks, we split the contract in two parts:
• The first part contains the expected value. We assume that the expected value will be paid at maturity and not at inception (as usual). Thus, at maturity, the seller pays the payoff and the buyer pays the value expected at inception.
• The second part represents the case when the buyer pays the premium not at maturity, but at inception. It exactly corresponds to a bond with a notional equal to the expected value.
Thus, on the uncollateralized part of derivative contracts, the operation value is equal to the value of a zero coupon bond, issued by the seller, on a notional equal to the expected value.
A bond rate is constituted by three rates:
• The Risk Free Rate • The Default Risk Spread Rate • The Bond-CDS Basis Spread Rate The Default Risk Rate is represented by the CDS Spread Rate, which corresponds to the cost of the counterparty probability of default before the maturity of the contract.
The Bond-CDS liquidity basis rate represents the difference of a bond spread and the matched maturity CDS spread on the same issuer/underlying. This difference can arise from credit factors (e.g. documentation, convertible issuance, expectations of debt buybacks) or liquidity factors (e.g. liquidity differences between markets, low bond market supply).
Similarly to the Liquidity Value Adjustment, the Funding Value Adjustment on a partially cash collateralized operation is: 
Key Remarks/Findings
We notice the following points:
• The full CSA Discounting corresponds to the particular case on which 1 00 % γ = .
• If the risk free rate is equal to the collateral rate, then LVA = 0.
• If the operation is fully collateralized ( 1 00 % γ = ), then FVA = 0.
• The framework presented is valid with values of recovery >0.
• The part represented by CDS r alone corresponds to the CVA/DVA adjustment on the MtM (instead of Exposure at Default). It is already comprised in the whole CVA/DVA impact.
• The objective of these adjustments calculation is to have a value which takes into account the real risks and costs the contract will involve. Knowing the real value of the contract, the dealer anticipates its hedging costs. Then, with complete information and competitiveness constraints, the dealer can decide to impact the client's price proposed to the client or not.
• The drift rate is equal to the risk free rate, in case of index or borrowable asset underlying.
Indeed, for indices, futures prices are quoted using the risk free rate, and for borrowable assets, the asset is bought and then lent (the loan of assets is fully collateralized in cash, thus the balance is flatted, but the asset lender pays the collateral rate, assimilated to the risk free rate).
Non-Cash Collateral
Wrong Way Risk
As a first step, the collateral in form of securities requires the upstream monitoring of an implied specific risk: the Wrong Way Risk.
Definition: The Wrong Way Risk (WWR) is the implicit existence of a negative correlation between the counterparty's exposure and credit quality.
In a non-cash collateralized product, the Wrong Way Risk can have two aspects: -Collateral / Product Wrong Way Risk: Collateral must be non-negatively correlated with the payoffs of products it guarantees. -Collateral / Counterparty Wrong Way Risk: Collateral must be non-positively correlated with the counterparty financial health or with the counterparty guarantors (clearly defined or potential) financial health.
To ensure upstream management and be certain not to hold wrong way positions, the monitoring of these correlations, on top of other considerations, must be ex-ante controlled.
Transforming Securities into Cash
For non-cash collateral, the Wrong Way Risk is a specific risk due to the nature of the collateral securities. It is an inefficiency of the collateral in its main role, which is to guarantee a replacement value in case of default. The subsequent parts do not address the collateral management in its guarantee role, but the collateral optimization as a liquidity provider.
Firstly, we will study the most intuitive option to provide liquidity, the exchange for cash. When a dealer holds collateral securities, his first action is to study the options to transform these securities into cash.
The main possibilities to transform non-cash collateral into cash are:
• Repo operations: The haircut and the rate of a security loan are determinant. Indeed, the value of a security loan is ( )
, where S is the securities value, SL H is the security loan haircut and SL r the security loan rate.
• Central bank loans: These collateralized loans (with low rates) are similar to repo operations. The Central banks accept a wider range of products, particularly since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis.
• Re-hypothecation as collateral: The re-hypothecation as collateral is not a direct transformation into cash like repo or central bank loans, it is a transformation "by replacement". It consists in posting the received non-cash collateral (instead of posting cash) as collateral on other operations.
For valuation, these three cases can be assimilated to the repo case. Indeed, central banks loans are securities loans and re-hypothecation as collateral is equivalent to make a repo operation and post the resulting cash as collateral.
Liquidity Value Adjustment
Assuming that securities posted as collateral can be transformed into cash by one of the enumerated possibilities, the Liquidity Value Adjustment for non-cash collateral is similar to cash collateral, with the involved modifications due to non-cash collateral specificities.
We saw above that the security loan value is:
( )
Thus, the cash conversion value is:
C a sh C o n versio n V a lu e = S H −
, and the continuous rate paid on this value is SL r .
On the collateralized part, the buyer receives securities instead of cash. The buyer and the seller have defined in the CSA what type of securities can be posted and their haircuts.
Thus, the value of posted securities is equal to the present value (PV) divided by ( )
CSA H is the haircut defined in the CSA and applied to the securities posted as collateral.
Securities Value = PV H −
Thus, the cash conversion value of the non-cash collateral is equal to:
The security lending market is a collateral market. Thus, the haircut applied on one security is unique. Following the same reasoning as in the cash collateral case, we obtain that the fully non-cash collateralized operation value is:
The Liquidity Value Adjustment on a partially non-cash collateralized operation is then:
, where γ is the collateralization and SL r is the security loan rate.
Thus:
PV with LVA LVA PV risk free e PV risk free
.2 Funding Value Adjustment
We saw above the pricing of the Liquidity Value Adjustment in the non-cash collateral case. In the same way as for the Liquidity Value Adjustment, the Funding Value Adjustment for non-cash collateral is similar to cash collateral, with the involved modifications due to non-cash collateral specificities.
The Funding Value Adjustment applies only on the non-collateralized part of the operation. Thus, its own value is not different with cash or non-cash collateral. The only difference is the final value of the operation.
The Funding Value Adjustment on a partially non-cash collateralized operation is: 
PV with LVA FVA e PV with LVA 
.2.3 Key remarks/findings
• The framework presented is only valid on re-hypothecable and transformable into cash assets received as collateral.
• The framework presented does not take into account the possibility of non-recovery of rehypothecated collateral. This point has been considered in the article: Brigo 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio Eligibility
As an alternative to transforming securities into cash, instead of directly exchanging non-cash collateral for cash, the dealer can study the eligibility of securities to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio.
The objective is to keep securities eligible as High Quality Liquid Assets (or exchange non eligible securities for eligible securities).
The idea is that securities eligible as High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) are not cash but can replace the cash allocated to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio.
Indeed, with cash being the most liquid asset (in level 1 of High Quality Liquid Assets), it is used in addition of securities to complete the collection of the High Quality Liquid Assets. Thus, each kept eligible securities free cash from the portfolio of assets dedicated to the LCR.
The High Quality Liquid Assets are composed of two levels of eligible assets:
This level includes cash, central bank reserves and certain marketable securities backed by sovereigns and central banks. There is no limit on the extent to which a bank can hold these assets to meet the LCR. Level 1 Assets are not subject to a haircut.
• Level 2: Assets of this level may not account for more than 40 percent of a bank's total HQLA. A minimum 15 percent haircut is applied to the current market value of each Level 2 asset held in the stock. They are sub-divided into Level 2A and Level 2B: -Level 2A assets include certain government securities, covered bonds (backed by on-balance sheet mortgages or other loans) and corporate debt securities.
Level 2B assets include lower rates corporate bonds, residential mortgage-backed securities and equities which meet certain conditions. These assets may not account for more than 15 percent of a bank's total stock of HQLA.
Equity management
When non-cash collateral is kept in the books (eligible to the LCR or not), the dealer usually puts the profits or losses of these assets in the "Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income" (AOCI) subsection of the Equity.
The "Other Comprehensive Income" is the difference between net income as in the Income Statement (Profit or Loss Account) and comprehensive income. It represents certain gains and losses not recognized in the P&L Account. These comprehensive income items are aggregated each earnings period, and thus are gathered in the AOCI statement.
This setting permits to keep securities (High Quality Liquid Assets or illiquid collateral) without hitting the equity base with their profits and losses.
A 58-word footnote in paragraph 52 of the Basel III document proposal revealed that the AOCI filter was under analysis for potential removal. This removal would lead to a huge volatility in the capital.
The Available For Sale Bonds, eligible as High Quality Liquid Assets (sovereign and agency bonds), represent a major part of these kept securities, as their first function is to hedge the deposit-taking business.
The certain development of OTC clearing with Central Counterparties, which admit only best sovereign bonds as non-cash collateral, will increase their scarcity.
The AOCI filter removal, if applied, would further intensify the lack of good quality collateral, as major players will only wish to hold in their books the lowest volatile assets. Moreover, in our context of low rates, this will cause massive losses when rates will rise back.
To size the impact of this potential change, Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo's Available For Sale portfolios accounted for USD 1.1 trillion in Q3 2012, with Mark to Market swings allowing for large CET1 volatility.
These points are currently being discussed with regulators as major banks try to convince them not to remove this filter.
Alternative solutions are being studied, like booking the AFS Bonds in Amortized Cost instead of Fair Value or allowing for both unrealized gains and losses to flow into CET 1.
These answers are not a panacea, as they would not resolve all the problems, or create others (due to the necessary rotation in the AFS Bonds portfolio or the remaining CET1 volatility).
Best Practices & Key Organizational Challenges
Preliminaries: Central Banks Collateral Eligibility practices
As an introduction to this section, we will first review the synthetic results of a comparative study of the evolution of major central banks' Collateral Management policies and associated eligibility criteria between mid-2007 and late 2012. This comparative study is based on the comparison between the practices of Central Banks in terms of collateralization and in particular, eligibility of financial institutions' assets as collateral.
In response to the conditions stressing the financial markets between mid-2007 and 2012, Central Banks tend to include more flexibility in terms of eligibility criteria (cf. table above). They tend to widen their range of eligible assets, not only in terms of typology of assets but also in terms of cross-border type of issuer and currency. Furthermore, Central Banks specifically adapted their cross-border arrangements to optimize the eligibility of assets issued in foreign currencies and therefore encourage circulation of liquidity over the borders.
• Bank of Canada included US Treasuries in its set of eligible collateral for its Standing Liquidity Facility in 2008.
• Bank of England and the Swiss National Bank 4 -as leaders in terms of cross-border arrangements even before the crisis -broadened their cross-border eligibility criteria in terms of both cross-border issuer and currency.
Central Banks also tend to take better account of their counterparty risk-profile and credit-worthiness in weighting specifically the terms of their arrangement according to stress and risk indicators:
• Impacting valuation haircuts and initial margins according to volatility. A concrete illustration is the Sveriges Riksbank decision to impact higher add-on haircuts for foreign exchange risk for USD-and JPY-denominated collateral to reflect higher FX volatility • Considering sensitivity and stressed parameters impacting the markets in the haircuts' structure through various characteristics (type, maturity, credit, liquidity of the assets). For example, the Eurosystem added a liquidity category dedicated to marketable assets and made haircuts vary also with credit quality triggers.
The main outcomes of these for our study is to understand that there are various standard levers (among them eligibility criteria) to be considered when dealing with a counterparty and therefore when negotiating collateralization arrangements.
The flexibility and trend of standardization which pushed Central Banks to adapt their conditions towards their dealing counterparty hints what will probably be a key concern in the coming years for the financial services industry.
On top of this, other factors push Collateral Management under scrutiny. To build our set of best practices we adopted different points of view to cover the different scopes and sets of Collateral Management best practices:
• Optimizing the collateralization through technical levers and appropriate negotiation of legal contracts & annexes.
• Improving the organizational business model and cost structure of collateral management through strategic choices / trade-offs: -In terms of articulation of business units and specialized desks, -In terms of cost-structure (internalization vs. externalization).
Overview of the Collateral Management Standard Practices
Current Operational Practices 5
For the purposes of this paper, we won't enter into much detail on following practices, which increasingly tends to be current practices, especially among large dealers. The synthesis of main current practices that have already impacted the financial services organizations is: 
Preliminaries to Considering Application of Independent Amount
It should be stressed that any transaction is not eligible to apply any type of arrangement.
(i) Considering the type of OTC transactions As mentioned above, using CSA annexes under ISDA contracts became more and more usual during these last years. Though figures tend to vary according to:
• The type of deal: Typically, 54 percent of short-term FX products (less risky and not worth to collateralize considering the time and costs of collateralization) were traded under an ISDA with a CSA, compared to 93 percent of CDS contracts -which are credit risk reduction products and considered riskier transactions.
• The type of dealing counterparty: FX deals are often traded by non-financial industries which tend to trade less under ISDA with associated CSA annexes. As a consequence OTC transactions that are not governed by a standard ISDA contracts (such as Commodities and FX products) won't be encompassed in the scope of our best practices.
(ii) Considering the type of legal jurisdictions and applicable form of collateralization There are differences in the usage of contracts according to region and countries. The most current forms of collateralization provided upon ISDA contracted trades and supported by CSA annexes are Security Interest or Title Transfer.
Segregation and best practices concerning holding of Independent Amount and Variation Margin are actually applicable only under Security Interest form.
Best practices towards superior management of contract terms, complementary to liquidity and funding strategy
We will focus on:
• Contractually-defined amounts impacting exposure, as Independent Amount and Thresholds.
• The types of business models and conditions in which such amounts are hold, taking into consideration externalization, segregation and delivery conditions. • Various forms of delivery / property and segregation of these contractual amounts.
Following our comparison between typical European and US contractual practices, counterparties should be able to freely choose their forms of contract considering their needs (e.g. a European Transfer Title form of collateralization is not adapted to segregation of IA / VM).
Best Practice (Contract flexibility enabling flexible negotiation)
Any dealer should be authorized and free to define with the dealing counterparty the terms of their transactions independently from their jurisdictions.
The essential resources to be provided for drafting a first version of the contract should be: -A set of applicable standardized clauses (provisions, contract enforcement in case of default, agreements regarding proprietary limitations, remuneration rate of collateral etc.),
-The support of legal specialists or at least appropriate entities.
Other inputs should be part of the agreements negotiation, particularly information regarding: -Risk profiles and strategies of the counterparties, -Risk that the parties are willing to take or hedge, -Agreements and actions to be taken in the event of default.
Note regarding segregation considerations: Before beginning with segregation, as one of the key levers of collateralization, we should stress one important point: Variation Margin shouldn't be considered segregated, because its aggregation mitigates the risk (e.g. by netting).
Note regarding Independent Amount: As we stressed earlier separating valuation considerations for both cash and non-cash collateral, it should be highlighted that best practices concerning segregation of Independent Amount apply to non-cash collateral.
Key collateralization levers: definitions, main characteristics and purposes
The main components of a collateralized exposure are: Credit Support Amount, Variation Margin, Independent Amount, Thresholds. The terms and valuation are specified within the ISDA contract.
Every definition provided below is based on the contractual definitions specified upon the contracts and annexes of a standard New York Law CSA and consequently based on ISDA definitions and other sources specified in the bibliography.
Definition: Credit Support Amount (CSA) is the amount of collateral delivered on a periodical basis (market practices is daily, especially by large dealers). The amount to be delivered is exchanged between the counterparties; the Pledger (or the Delivering Party) will deliver the due amount to the Receiver (also known as the Secured Party).
Definition: The threshold amount is an unsecured credit exposure that the parties are prepared to accept before asking for collateral.
It can be defined as either a fixed or variable currency amount that changes in response to changes in the credit rating of the party concerned. Ideally, threshold amounts are set at relatively low levels in order to maximize credit risk mitigation.
Definition: The Independent Amount, (also called Initial Margin 6 ,) is an additional credit support amount that is required over and above the market value of the trade portfolio.
It can be defined as any amount that the parties agree, expressed as a fixed currency amount, a percentage of the notional, or a computation of value-at-risk. Independent Amount can be defined at the level of the portfolio between two parties, or uniquely for each individual transaction. The main purpose of the independent amount is to cover the anticipated market movement during any potential liquidation process. Where t is the date of delivery, The involved parties in the contract are as follows: the Pledger P and the Secured Party SP, E(t) is the Exposure of the Secured Party, ∑ IA(t) is the sum of aggregated Independent Amount applicable and due on t time Tp is the Threshold of the Pledger Therefore the valuation and level of collateralization will mainly depend on the amount and characteristics of the Independent Amount and Threshold. These amounts can be understood as "buffers" that increase or decrease the Credit Support Amount. They are deeply correlated to the overall credit exposure, counterparty creditworthiness and risk profile.
• Independent Amount increases the value of posted collateral, and is considered as a form of financial guarantee, as an additional part of collateral to protect the Counterparty against residual risks.
• On the contrary, Threshold reduces the overall exposure, which implies the Counterparty accepts to keep a certain amount of risks within its books.
Best Practices (Proprietary Arrangements)
Independent Amount and Threshold are antagonist principles and tend to cancel each other out when contracted under the same agreements.
These arrangements are a key step of negotiation where clauses and terms of the agreements (such as Independent Amounts and Thresholds) should reflect the risk strategies of each counterparty, as Independent Amounts and Thresholds are the illustration of how much risk each counterparty is willing to respectively secure with a guarantee or take.
In anticipation to Part 2.4 Organizational Impacts, it should be noted that negotiation of arrangements as a key part of deal initiation, should closely be handled together with: 
Strategic Trade-offs when entering into an OTC transaction under standardized agreements:
The negotiations between counterparties can be interpreted as a trade-off between Segregation and Rehypothecation, as it confronts two antagonist principles:
• On the one hand, it ensures the propriety of delivered assets and perfection of claims, • On the other hand, it optimizes the return of posted collateral in authorizing re-hypothecation.
Mitigation of Legal risks vs. Funding / Liquidity optimization
The financial crisis provided many examples of counterparties -hedge funds for example -engaged in transactions with "too-big-to-fail" institutions that were unable to get back their collateral pledge for various reasons:
• Collateral pledged was locked-up in the bankruptcy process with the defaulting counterparty;
• Collateral pledged had been re-hypothecated and was not eligible anymore;
• Other debtors / counterparties were proprietary in the collateral recovery process, etc.
These events encompassed legal risks. We will define these risks and identify how dealers are currently mitigating and considering these legal risks.
Legal risks represent the risk that collateral cannot be recovered in case of a default (approaching default e can also be considered in some jurisdictions). Four types of legal risks have been identified. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on the first three, as the fourth requires a strong legal background.
Perfection risk:
Inability to achieve deal perfection by a counterparty, i.e. the counterparty can't identify legal ownership when defaulting (or in approaching situation of default).
Ineligible collateral r:
-Risk of re-characterization: The collateral becomes ineligible and possibly recharacterized. As a consequence, it would be locked-up within bankruptcy proceedings in the defaulting counterparty's jurisdiction laws. -Risk of priority: The collateral pledged cannot be returned because the dealing counterparty has a prior claim on this same amount.
Enforcement risk:
The dealing counterparty does not return the whole amount of collateral.
This can happen if the laws within the dealing counterparty's legal jurisdiction is lax regarding enforcement of contracts or in case of political pressures on certain types of financial deals and practices.
(Contract) Obsolescence Risk: The contract and annexes (if any) are:
-Too long, resulting in operational delays and incapacity for F/O operators to trade (additional potential risk of opportunity) ; -Out-dated, resulting in room for contract breaches or inefficient coverage of transactions through legal agreements etc.
There are many types of legal risks that should be considered when entering into an OTC transaction. Furthermore, these risks -as they are strongly correlated to IA and the level of collateralizationindirectly impact the calculation and valuation of LVA and FVA charges. Although the chances of these risks occurring are low, the following example illustrates the potential significant losses that can incur.
The Lehman Brothers' case precisely illustrates how debtors might suffer from consequent losses because 1) their IAs were over-estimated, providing an over-collateralized exposure towards Lehman 2) their IAs were held by Lehman directly and eligible for re-hypothecation.
When Lehman entered into bankruptcy 1) the IAs held under re-hypothecation had been locked-up in Lehman's bankruptcy proceedings, 2) some of these IAs being over-estimated by the counterparties, the gap between their amount and the fair amount to be returned is significant, implying significant losses once the bankruptcy proceedings are finished.
Best practice (Legal risks and collateralization level assessment)
Considering the impact of Legal Risks on collateral exposure and IA, should be reminded as a best practice, as the consequences in terms of potential losses can be critical. Furthermore, collateralization level and estimation of the amount of IA should be strongly related to the next best practice.
There are two strategies to mitigate legal risks, and are complementary to one another, i.e. dealing counterparties can choose to both segregate and limit re-hypothecation.
(i) Segregation:
• Externalizing the ownership of IAs and therefore considering the type of business model (third party involved or not (cf. organizational part) -Via third party custodian services or tri-party agreements (also involving a third-party custodian which won't be an affiliate of the involved counterparties in the transaction).
• Considering ownership of Independent Amount and Variation Margin in Security Interest
Contracts: (Segregation is further specified in legal arrangements, the dealer will be the direct holder of IA but not under unrestricted conditions) -Segregation of IA and VM cash flows at the delivery date -Segregation in cash pools of IA and VM -Segregation in terms of typology of assets (e.g. VM delivered in cash and IA delivered in ear-marked securities for a better propriety tracking).
(ii) Limiting / Forbidding Re-hypothecation: -Re-hypothecation can be limited or tracked through ear-marked assets.
-Re-hypothecation can simply be forbidden in the contract. Under such conditions, collateral will be restricted to the Custodian cash pools and won't be remunerated.
Liquidity and Funding Strategy
Other key elements, studied in the next chapter, include Liquidity and Funding Management, whichcan only be considered upon authorized re-hypothecation. Best practices are described below:
Furthermore, our analysis is heavily dependent on the optimization of the collateral circuit. Below is an illustration of Collateral Management best practices, with regards to Collateral Circuit optimization. 
Organizational Impacts
Internal Collateral Management
Here we distinguish between existing / standard functions, assuming CIBs business models have already internalized these functions; from recent / new keys functions that have emerged since the financial crisis, as well as discuss the growing concerns that have put Collateral Management under scrutiny.
Overview of current organizational practices and advancements
To begin, we will illustrate the organizational impacts by identifying key functions of existing organizations. Once described, we will identify key advancements of these functions: To reformulate what we mentioned earlier, these adjustments are logically correlated to Independent Amounts and Thresholds because they are all linked to the exposure of the Counterparty.
-Market / Best practice: This is why as an organizational market practice / best practice, CVA and DVA desks currently adjoin the other trading desks. This practice is particularly observable on products encompassing credit risks such as IR swaps and CDS where CVA / DVA and LVA / FVA needs to be calculated at the pricing stage of the deal.
• Funding (both secured and unsecured): As a key step of the collateralization, funding of derivatives trades and portfolio became a strategic function as the resource of banks and financial institutions were put under pressure. Funding issues on trading portfolios were traditionally handled by the Treasury desk.
-Market/Best practice: 60 percent 7 of dealers on the financial markets dedicated a central funding desk to optimize the F/O trading desks' derivatives portfolio.
• Monitoring and reporting (Risk Management and Regulatory requirements): Recent regulations put much pressure on financial institutions in terms of both risk monitoring and reporting. Furthermore, new capital requirements have also been added in the forms of supplementary buffers and provisions.
-Market practice: Risk management departments are handling these new mandates since they already have the market and portfolio data needed to actively monitor and measure risks. 
Best practice (Risk
A trend towards centralization of the new collateral-related functions:
As aforementioned in paragraph 2.4.1.1, there is an on-going trend to centralize Collateral-related functions, which are being migrated to centralized entities adjoined to the F/O trading desks. This is the case for the following activities:
• Funding activities (secured or unsecured) on trading portfolios • Management of disputes and netting agreements which should be more frequently and actively monitored by the centralized Front Office Collateral desks =, instead of the Back Office Collateral desks.
Key findings: Organizational Evolutions and Transformations
To summarize our key findings thus far, we've drawn an illustrative example (cf. next page), which depicts the internal collateral life-cycle and reflects notable trends currently transforming CIB models: The new centralized desks created to manage valuation adjustments and related matters, have the following responsibilities:
(i) Collateral desks
• Collateral desks handle operations collateral and liquidity management, as well as collateral risk monitoring (such as correlation risks, WWR).
• Collateral desks also perform: (ii) CVA / DVA desks
• CVA / DVA desks handle adjustments on CVA / DVA and Funding Value (interconnected with CVA / DVA, cf. Chapter One).
• CVA / DVA desks have additional tasks which may include: -FVA Pricing and Management; Modeling Bond-CDS basis management (monitoring / hedging) Calibration / Pricing; Implementation of a set of limits.
External Collateral Management
Models for Unrestricted Holding of Independent Amounts
There are three models used to hold / segregate Independent Amounts:
(i) Direct Dealer Holding the IA
• Description: The dealing counterparty receiving the collateral should hold it.
• Pros: -Re-hypothecation flexibility: The counterparties can choose to re-use the collateral or not, and specify the type of reinvestment and yield within the contract (cf. below). -Ensure the transaction time of the propriety and the eligibility of collateral.
-Apply a recovery rate on re-hypothecated collateral, (cf. Chapter One).
(ii) Segregation with a Third-Party Custodian
• Description: A custodian is holding the segregated IA exchanged bilaterally by both counterparties. The mandates of the custodian can vary from strictly holding collateral, to fully managing it across all the collateral management lifecycle. To conclude, a single perfect model does not exist; instead, there are different models, each offering a large variety of options. This flexibility is a key advantage for counterparties, but can also become a weakness in the event of default if the counterparty underestimated some of the above listed criteria.
Furthermore the risks and financial losses are even higher considering the event of default and the extreme case of bankruptcy, when the timeline to get back the collateral can become widely uncertain, as illustrated during the financial crisis. This implies financial markets will have to rely more and more on their risk functions to model different impacts in terms of financial losses (e.g. estimation of recovery rates, speed of seizure of collateral) and identify different types of default scenarios. CCPs offering custodian services will be heavily impacted by future regulations. The margin amounts posted is expected to grow significantly in the coming years. These changes will cause stakeholders to question whether:
• The CCPs are able to absorb the demand of all financial markets stakeholders? If yes, will the degree of services provided be sufficient to appropriately mitigate the various types of risks involved? • These structures are sufficiently capitalized to support the event of default at large scales if a financial crisis occurs and spreads all across the financial markets?
On the other hand, the Financial Services Industry and Investment Banking firms specifically understand that the new robust requirements and cash scarcity generate a true opportunity for their Collateral Management Services.
We identified two major topics that should draw dealing counterparties and, at a wider extent, financial market stakeholders' interests:
• Over Speculation: The example of Lehman's over speculation and bankruptcy showed that Investment Banking firms could see Collateral Management as an opportunity to yield strong returns, especially when considering new opportunities offered by the young market of Collateral Management services (though some pioneers such as Bank of New York Mellon opened the path to such services in the early 80s).
• Manipulation of Counterparties and Service Offerings: Following the recent events described in this article, major investment banking firms such as JP Morgan and Bank of America reacted by proposing "collateral transformation" services. These allowed collateral trading by offering the possibility to swap lower-rated securities not qualified to regulatory standards in return for a loan of Treasuries / other assets that are eligible.
-Investment banks are leading the OTC derivatives market (largest dealing portfolio of OTC derivatives with a commingled value of USD$ 140 trillion). However, stakeholders are proposing collateral optimization for the same market to cover the same products. -This activity is becoming more and more profitable even under the current tight and stressed market conditions, sparking conflicts of interest and temptation to manipulate products in order to take advantage of collateral trading to hide risks. -For the moment, regulators across the world have not considered regulating such activities. A recent article stressed that the problem will probably be addressed once more experience is gained on such practices.
Collateral Arbitrage
Preliminaries
The major players in the OTC derivatives market have developed, in addition to the best practices of collateral optimization exposed above, a set of collateral arbitrages.
These arbitrages can be split in two categories: -Classic Collateral Arbitrage: Making asymmetric collateral agreements to receive more collateral (in cash preferably) than posted. The dealer uses his advantageous position to persuade smaller players to conclude imbalanced collateral agreements. -Back-to-Back Collateral Arbitrage: Dealing back-to-back operations to receive cash and post securities. The dealer has a buy position on a cash collateralized product and a sell position on the same non-cash collateralized product.
The purpose of these arbitrages is to optimize the collateral portfolio to obtain the highest positive net cash collateral balance. This net cash collateral balance constitutes a low rate re-financing pool.
As an example of collateral arbitrage, in December 2009, Goldman Sachs's $110 billion net collateral balance was almost three times the amount it had attracted from depositors at its regulated bank subsidiaries. This collateral could have earned the bank an annual return of $878 million, assuming it was financed at the Fed funds effective rate of 0.15 percent and reinvested in two-year Treasury notes yielding 0.948 percent (at that time).
Classic Collateral Arbitrage
The finest dealers have a negotiating power that creates advantages when dealing with hedge-funds. They use their advantage to coerce asset managers to accept asymmetrical collateral agreements. These asymmetrical contracts can have several features: -The counterparty agrees to a unilateral contract on bilateral potential exposure deals -The counterparty consents to unfair haircuts (comparatively to the repo market) -The counterparty has to post more cash collateral than the dealer -The counterparty has to post cash collateral while the dealer can post non-cash collateral This kind of unfair arrangement, called "classic collateral arbitrage" enables dealers to capture cash collateral (funded at low collateral rate) from small asset managers.
Back-to-Back Collateral Arbitrage
This kind of collateral arbitrage is an arbitrage we call "pure collateral arbitrage", in contrast to the classic collateral arbitrage described above. In this case of arbitrage, deals are not done to generate a payoff, but to uniquely transform non-cash collateral to cash. The Back-to-Back Collateral Arbitrage consists in dealing back-to-back deals with two counterparties, with cash collateral received on the buy side and non-cash collateral posted on the sell side.
Valuation of the Back-to-Back Collateral Arbitrage
There are different ways to use non-cash collateral:
-Transformation into cash -Replacement of cash in the Liquidity Coverage Ratio -Securities held by default (non-transformable into cash and ineligible to the LCR) These options have to be taken into account when deciding to engage in collateral arbitrage. Indeed, the dealer will receive cash from one counterparty and post an equivalent value of securities to the other. From the dealer's perspective, arbitrage can be seen as replacing a certain amount of securities with cash, where back-to-back products only impact the arbitrage with their potential exposure (greater exposure means greater collateral value).
The collateral value is equal to the present value, thus, in all the cases described above, the cash collateral value is C ash C ollateral V alue P resent V alue = and the non-cash collateral value is:
( ) In the following sections, we will study the three different valuation cases of the arbitrage, according to the non-cash collateral usage.
Prior to this, we recall that the cash collateral side is independent of the posted securities side and the securities' possible uses. Thus, the cash collateral value is: 
Case 2: Securities Intended to be Kept as High Quality Liquid Assets
The securities eligible as High Quality Liquid Assets replace cash retained for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio. These securities can then be assimilated to cash (no specific conversion formula).
As presented in Chapter One, level 1 assets are not subject to a haircut but level 2 assets have a minimum haircut rate of 15 percent. 
Key Remarks and Findings
• Contrary to expected results, arbitrage can be profitable in both ways (receiving and posting the cash / non-cash collateral), and not only in receiving cash and posting securities. Profitability strongly depends on the various possible uses of securities.
• As presented in Chapter One, the Funding Value Adjustment applies only to the noncollateralized part of the operation. It has no link with the Back-to-Back Collateral Arbitrage. Moreover, arbitrage is only risk-free if the deals are fully collateralized; otherwise the arbitrageur is exposed to counterparty risk on each back-to-back counterparty. Thus, to achieve risk-free arbitrage, we considered a fully collateralized operation ( 1 00 % γ = , FVA=0).
